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IMPORTING GENDERED LEGAL REASONING FROM ENGLAND: WIFE 
MURDERS IN EARLY COLONIAL INDIA, 1805-1857  
Daniel J.R. Grey 
INTRODUCTION 
In July 1825, the Supreme Criminal Court for Bengal, known as the Nizamat Adalat, 
reviewed the case of Chait Ram, a man who had been charged at the Bareilly sessions with 
the murder of his wife, Mussumaut Dhunkeeah.
1
 Ram freely admitted killing her and even 
identified the weapon he had used, but claimed the murder was the result of his wife’s 
adultery with a neighbour. Since the killing of a wife caught in the act of adultery was not a 
crime under Islamic law, and all Indians charged with crimes in the first half of the 
nineteenth century – regardless of their own religion – were dealt with by British judges in 
relation to this system of jurisprudence, the qazis (Islamic law officers) of both the sessions 
court and the Nizamat Adalat recommended he be released from custody at once.
2
 While one 
of the three officiating British judges argued that Ram had not sufficiently proven that his 
wife had indeed been conducting an affair, and suggested that a sentence of life imprisonment 
would be appropriate given the circumstances, his two colleagues disagreed and upheld the 
qazis ruling. Ram was freed immediately ‘without further punishment’.3  
At one level, the case of Chait Ram and the decision of the British officials to follow 
the recommendation of the Muslim legal scholars who reviewed it can perhaps be seen as 
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part of the wider policy of early colonial rulers to attempt to maintain the facade of 
benevolence by not interfering overtly with established Indian legal practice. Yet the Nizamat 
Adalat played a central role in the rise of the new ‘Anglo-Muhammadan’ criminal law that 
developed between the late-eighteenth and mid-nineteenth century.
4 
British judges had few 
qualms dismissing reports by Islamic law officers when they fundamentally disagreed with 
the judgment given. Moreover, an approach which focuses exclusively on what such verdicts 
meant in terms of the perception of violence in India ignores the fact that remarkably similar 
cases of wife-killing – and remarkably similar outcomes – were by no means unusual back in 
Britain. Indeed, it was well established by precedents in both English and Scots law dating 
back to at least the sixteenth century that if a man caught his wife in the act of adultery and 
killed one or both of them on the spot, this should always be treated as manslaughter rather 
than the capital offence of murder.
5
 The informal criminal defence in India of ‘injured 
masculine honour’ was dramatically narrowed from the turn of the nineteenth century 
onwards.
6
  Yet in practice this remained a popular – and extremely effective – appeal by men 
to the judiciary throughout the colonial period.
7
 As Padma Anagol has demonstrated for 
Western India, this willingness to accept pleas of provocation by men as mitigating domestic 
murders did not apply to those cases of Indian wives who killed their husbands, since these 
women were frequently portrayed as cold-blooded schemers.
8
 The English courts also 
substantially tightened their understanding of what counted as ‘provocation’ during these 
decades, yet it remained the case that a certain level of violence towards wives could still be 
dismissed as constituting legitimate correction.   
As Catherine Hall and others have noted, events in Britain and its Empire never 
occurred in isolation from each other, but there was a complicated and ongoing reciprocal 
relationship between colony and metropole throughout and beyond the nineteenth century.
9
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Moreover, these links and transfers were not inevitably confined to a linear back and forth of 
exchanges in culture, law and politics centred on Britain itself, but such metaphorical and 
material border crossings could and did occur between different colonies as well, with or 
without also returning to the United Kingdom.
10
 As Kirsten McKenzie has observed, ‘What 
was gossip in Cape Town could soon become gossip in Sydney, Calcutta or London’.11 In 
recent years, historians have become increasingly interested in the ways that law did  – or, 
perhaps more surprisingly, sometimes did not – become a part of this process of crossing 
borders.
12
 Legal pluralism formed a major element of colonial policy and practice for all 
European powers, and Britain was no exception.
13
 Despite the inherently hierarchical nature 
of the British Empire and the privileged status within it of English common and statute law, 
perhaps most emphatically demonstrated by the fact that the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council formed the ultimate court of appeal for all British-held overseas territories from 1833 
onwards,
14
 colonial legal systems never simply abolished pre-existing laws entirely or 
exported those from ‘back home’ without amendment. White settler societies in particular 
were often able to demand that their ‘local’ perspectives were taken into consideration when 
formulating legislation that had originally been proposed in London, insisting that the 
combination of whiteness  and their personal knowledge of these regions necessitated that 
their input on whether such laws and their operation were ‘right’ should be taken seriously.15 
Yet, not only was the idea of overarching ‘British justice’ frequently held up as a key element 
of the benign imperial project and as theoretically a resource available to indigenous colonial 
subjects,
16
 but so too was the idea of ‘authenticity’.17 Especially during the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century, this idea was underscored by a supposed respectful adherence to 
indigenous laws and customs – at least wherever this was deemed possible within the 
boundaries of good governance and ‘civilising influence’.18 David Washbrook has noted that 
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although these competing and sometimes directly contradictory impulses were a key element 
in shaping colonial law, the paradoxes this generated were rarely if ever acknowledged.
19
 
METHODOLOGY AND CASE HISTORIES 
This article focuses on the reports of wife-murder cases that were reviewed by the 
Court of Nizamat Adalat between 1805, when the court first published its law reports, and the 
upheavals of 1857 that heralded dramatic changes to the judicial and administrative systems 
of colonial India.
20
  Based in Calcutta, the city that remained the seat of British power in 
India until 1911, the Nizamat Adalat was responsible for considering all criminal cases heard 
in Bengal Presidency – a span of territory covering not only a broad swathe of north-eastern 
India, but also including present-day Bangladesh – which either involved a capital sentence, a 
sentence of life imprisonment, or where a point of law had been questioned by the sessions 
judge trying a particular case.
21
 The Supreme Criminal Courts for Madras and Bombay (the 
Faujdari Adalats) followed similar procedures, although these did not publish their own 
reports on the cases they reviewed until the late 1840s.
22
 Prisoners themselves never appeared 
before the Nizamat Adalat. Instead, the court would be sent a collection of written reports 
about the trial, including the opinion of the sessions judge or magistrate on the proceedings, 
and the recommendation of the qazi attached to their court, who noted in turn what the 
verdict and sentence would be under Islamic law (sharia).
23
 As noted above, in these cases 
Islamic law applied even to Hindu prisoners. These reports were then reviewed by the Islamic 
law officer of the Nizamat Adalat itself, whose own report was added (including whether this 
confirmed or disagreed with the fatwa issued by the other qazi), and the collated papers were 
then submitted to between one and three British judges for their consideration, with the 
possibility that the court might demand further investigations be carried out by the sessions 
court officials before handing down their judgement.
24
 As such, the reports never contain 
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direct testimony by witnesses, the defendants, or court officials: at best these were recorded 
second hand. Reports could also vary tremendously in their level of detail when edited for 
publication: the reader can often be left with only tantalising fragments of information about 
the ways in which the court came to their eventual decision. Wherever possible, and 
particularly in cases where the possibility of insanity was raised, this collection of papers 
would also include reference to the findings of the civil surgeon who had been consulted by 
the sessions court to conduct a post-mortem on the victim or observe the prisoner in 
custody.
25
 Facilities and training for colonial medical jurisprudence were very limited at this 
time, the first such text, published in India in 1854 specifically lamented ‘such is very rarely 
obtainable here; and the public officer must rely chiefly on himself’.26 Despite this, some 
judges at the Nizamat Adalat clearly made efforts to stay aware of the latest developments in 
the field. In one apparently unique instance, in a case from 1854 where the husband had 
attempted to disguise his wife’s death as suicide by hanging, when considering the evidence 
the judges actually made specific reference to the relevant page number of the renowned 
American physician Thomas Beck’s Elements of Medical Jurisprudence.27 If theoretically the 
remit of the court was to deliver British interpretations of ‘authentic’ and ‘fair’ Islamic 
criminal law to Indian subjects, however, in practice, from 1807 onwards ‘the criminal law 
applied in the Indian law courts had entirely lost its Islamic character except in name’.28 This 
was especially true with regards to homicide cases, since British officials found the existing 
Islamic legal system for dealing with unlawful killing, and the condoning of some types of 
homicide, to be problematic at best and reprehensible at worst.
29
 Stories of barbaric ‘Oriental’ 
crimes and the idea that these atrocities might be readily accepted by the population were 
common, such as the anecdote repeated by John Kaye in his 1853 history of the East India 
Company that an Indian man put on trial for cutting off his wife’s nose in Madras during the 
1760s as punishment for adultery had expressed bafflement that the British considered this a 
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crime.
30
 Unsurprisingly, then, the colonial judges sitting in the Nizamat Adalat were, while 
working in an ostensibly separate legal system and bound by different rules, subtly but 
powerfully influenced by similar ideas and experiences to those of their peers in the English 
judiciary during this period.
31
 While further substantial reforms of the criminal law were 
mooted as early as the 1830s, in practice the existing judicial framework was only abolished 
after the uprising of 1857, and the subsequent imposition of the Indian Penal Code in 1860.  
 
For a present-day reader who consults these reports, the high rate of lethal domestic 
violence that was dealt with by the Nizamat Adalat is particularly noticeable. Elizabeth 
Kolsky has pointed out that these killings of women by intimate partners accounted for more 
than a third of all the murder cases that were reviewed by the court in the first half of the 
nineteenth century.
32
 This article examines the treatment of 131 cases in which men were 
convicted of having murdered their wives had their sentence reviewed by the Nizamat Adalat 
between 1805 and 1857, located through combing through the law reports that were 
published by the court. While in 50 cases the death sentence passed by the sessions courts 
was confirmed (38 per cent of the total), it is worth noting that the next highest proportion of 
outcomes for this sample, 20 cases, (15.2 per cent of the total) was that the guilty husband 
was instead convicted following the review on the lesser charge of culpable homicide, and 
received the comparatively lenient sentence of imprisonment of five years or less – with or 
without hard labour (see Table 1.). Eighteen men (13.7 per cent of the total) were sentenced 
to transportation for life.
33
 Almost as high as this, however, seventeen men (12.9 per cent of 
the total) received a sentence of life imprisonment, either with or without hard labour. 
Depending on the view of the court as to how harshly a man should be punished, then, a man 
who killed his wife thus had roughly equivalent chances of having a death sentence 
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commuted to life imprisonment, transportation for life, or the lesser sentence of up to five 
years in jail. Twelve men (9.1 per cent) were to be imprisoned for a term between 7 and 14 
years. In just six instances during this period (4.5 per cent of the total) the court decreed after 
reviewing all the reports that the earlier conviction at the sessions court was unsafe, and ruled 
the accused man should be considered acquitted of the charge.
34
 In seven of these 131 cases 
(5.3 per cent of the total), one or more others – neighbours, brothers, cousins, and in one 
instance the guilty man’s mother – were also accused by the sessions court of being either 
accessories to the murder, or attempting to conceal the killing from the authorities. Alleged 
accomplices (excluded from Table 1 below) were invariably handed down a lesser sentence 
by the Nizamat Adalat, since they were held to be less culpable than the guilty husband. The 
most severe judgment delivered to anyone convicted as an accomplice was the sentence of 
life imprisonment handed down in 1855 to Mussamaut Tara, the sole woman so accused, 
while her son had his death sentence confirmed for the murder of his wife. This severity was, 
however, little to do with the woman’s unique status in the ranks of these accomplices as a 
female accessory to the murder of her adolescent daughter-in-law, and much more about the 
especially horrific circumstances of the crime: the victim had been subjected to sustained 
sexual torture before she died.
35
   
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
TABLE 1. OUTCOME FOR HUSBANDS CONVICTED IN 131 WIFE-MURDER 
CASES IN BENGAL THAT WERE REVIEWED BY THE NIZAMAT ADALAT, 
1805-1857 
DEATH 
SENTENCE 
CONFIRMED 
Imprisonment  
for Life 
Transport. Prison   
7-14 
years  
Prison 
 5 
years 
or 
less 
Found 
Insane 
Released Acquit. Died 
awaiting  
review 
of trial 
50 17 18 12 20 4 3 6 1 
 
 It should be noted that this overall figure of 131 cases excludes those reviews by the 
court of the murder of concubines, charges of the culpable homicide of wives, and those 
instances in which men killed both their spouse and other relatives at the same time, since the 
former were perceived (rightly or wrongly) as holding a lesser status than wives, and the 
latter murders were invariably considered to be exceptional even by the standards of 
homicide cases and tended to incur more uniformly severe responses.
36
 Moreover, all cases of 
wife-killing reviewed by the court exclusively involved Indian married couples, rather than 
interracial married couples or European husbands and wives. There is also regrettably 
insufficient space here to consider the similarities and – more pointedly – the differences in 
the judicial treatment of indigenous defendants and of those European men living in India 
who were charged with the murder or assault of their wives at other courts. Cases such as that 
of Private Peter Hutchinson, a British soldier tried at Bombay in July 1846 for the murder of 
his wife after he had suspected her of adultery, could sometimes provoke heated debates 
about how such crimes should be dealt with.
 37
 Yet despite the rhetoric of ‘justice for all’ so 
frequently employed by the British Empire, given the concern with preserving racial prestige 
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and the ideal of white superiority, in several respects criminal trials of European defendants 
in India followed rather different (and invariably much more lenient) lines than those 
involving indigenous colonial subjects.
38
  
 
CULTURAL RELATIVISM AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE NIZAMAT 
ADALAT 
Before examining these cases in detail, it is first essential to set out the context for 
understanding how domestic violence (both lethal and not) was dealt with by the English 
legal system in this period, and the corresponding attitudes and precedents that British judges 
would have been aware of and influenced by while reviewing cases in Bengal. What 
constituted unacceptable behaviour within an English marriage, up to and including physical 
attacks, was a subject very much up for debate in the years covered by this article. Attitudes 
towards domestic violence were never monolithic.
39
 It was generally agreed that a husband 
might be allowed to ‘give his wife moderate correction’.40 That a husband was also allowed 
to physically confine his wife against her will was also accepted (however uncomfortably) 
until the case of R. v. Jackson in 1891 overturned this principle.
41
 Crucially, however, there 
was no firm consensus on what precisely this ‘moderate correction’ actually meant, and it 
was also affirmed in legal texts that ‘this power of correction was confined within reasonable 
bounds, and the husband was prohibited from using any violence to his wife...’.42  The 1790 
ruling by Sir William Scott in the marital separation case of Evans v. Evans had 
simultaneously rejected setting out any formal definition what constituted of ‘cruelty’ while 
emphasising that emotional abuse did not fall under this heading, but only clear threats to 
physical well-being – although this might still be understood by the courts as a category that 
went beyond perpetrating physical violence alone.
43
 This view was reiterated by the Report of 
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the Royal Commission on Divorce in 1853, who specifically commended Scott’s 
interpretation.
44
  
That domestic violence might increasingly be perceived in Britain after 1800 as a 
specifically working-class issue, as it ultimately came to be labelled by mid-century, was by 
no means inevitable, nor does this period fit easily into a neat chronology of gradual 
‘improvement’ in legal or social attitudes to wife-beating.45 After all, the repeated abuse 
suffered by the upper-middle-class writer Caroline Norton at the hands of her husband 
George, an aristocratic Tory Member of Parliament, was widely known and decried in society 
circles during the early nineteenth century. Given Caroline Norton’s influential connections, 
her ongoing mistreatment had arguably been the trigger for bringing about the first reforms of 
child custody legislation in 1839, and this remained significant in the run-up to the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 that substantially expanded access to divorce in England and 
Wales.
46
 Even after the passage of this Act, the establishment of the Divorce Court in 1857, 
and an increasingly explicit dimension of class prejudice in press and political discussions of 
domestic violence, cases of wife-beating by middle- and upper-class British men were still 
represented in fiction, reported in the media, and came before the courts.
47
 Nonetheless, 
Victorian legislative reforms designed to address this subject, such as the Aggravated 
Assaults on Women and Children Act 1853, focused specifically on the vulnerability of those 
‘deserving’ working-class women who were targeted by violent husbands, the heavy subtext 
being that married men from other class backgrounds did not commit such crimes.
48
 Cases of 
wife-killing in England were also profoundly affected by these issues, and guilty men could 
be treated with great sympathy if it was believed they had been provoked by their wife’s 
unreasonable behaviour.  When Richard Griffin was tried at the Old Bailey for the murder of 
his wife Ann in 1810, despite his open admission that he had slit his wife’s throat, and 
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multiple witnesses confirming that he had announced ‘I shall be happy if she is a dead 
woman, and I shall die a happy man’, he was found guilty of manslaughter rather than murder 
and sentenced to just a year’s imprisonment at Newgate Prison and the fine of a single 
shilling.
49
 It is difficult to understand how the jury can have reached such a verdict, or the 
judge imposed such a lenient sentence, save that they believed Griffin’s (unsubstantiated) 
claim that his wife was openly unfaithful, a claim that was also frequently presented as 
mitigation in the Indian criminal courts for the killing of wives. Ultimately, blurred lines in 
English courtrooms over what might count as ‘legitimate correction’, and the assumption that 
domestic violence was supposedly caused by the dual failures of working-class men to 
control themselves properly and of working-class women (either in choosing a husband 
poorly, or in ‘provoking’ violence) also played a key role in how British judges and civil 
servants paradoxically viewed this issue as simultaneously alien, familiar, and – above all –  
inevitable when it came before the courts in colonial India. 
 
For nineteenth-century British commentators, while the high rate of spousal abuse – 
and in particular, lethal domestic violence – was agreed to be a significant problem in India, 
there was little enthusiasm for tackling it.  Indeed, when the first substantial text on forensic 
medicine in India was published in 1870, the author opened with the fictional example of a 
wife-murder as one of the most ‘typical’ suspicious deaths that a colonial physician would 
need to investigate.
50
 Wife-beating, and even the murder of wives, was generally believed to 
be an issue that remained impossible to solve, a regrettable but seemingly inescapable 
consequence of indigenous subjects belonging to an ‘inferior’ race and religion.51 Class, too, 
played an important if perhaps less overt role here in shaping these opinions. Although the 
occupation of prisoners was not systematically recorded in the Nizamat Adalat reports, the 
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overwhelming majority of accused husbands where reference was made to their work seem to 
have been agricultural labourers.
52
 Middle-class Indian defendants in wife-murder cases were 
much more unusual, and perceived as exceptional.
53
 Indeed, when in 1853 the court reviewed 
the case of Gookoolnath Mitter, described as ‘a man of education [who] is respectably 
connected’,54 the Nizamat Adalat was actually moved to rebuke the presiding sessions judge 
for his explicit assumption that as a rare bhadralok defendant the man’s claims of gross 
provocation and infidelity by his wife should be upheld without further investigation, and a 
purely nominal sentence of imprisonment bestowed.
55
 They did, nonetheless, eventually 
concur that the case should be reduced from one of murder to culpable homicide: Mitter was 
sentenced to five years’ imprisonment with hard labour.56  Unlike the colonial consensus of 
the late nineteenth century that labelled Bengali men as effete when compared to their British 
counterparts,
57
 cases of wife murder brought before the Nizamat Adalat between 1805 and 
1857 frequently emphasized instead the vulnerability of women to husbands who were often 
not only physically strong from a life of agricultural labour, but were represented as 
profoundly and dangerously emotionally volatile.
58
 This idea could also be tied to missionary 
discourses which inferred all African or South Asian peoples required the intervention of 
Christianity in order to form normal and healthy family relationships.
59
 As George Campbell, 
a civil servant working in Bengal described the situation in 1852: 
The great majority of murders are of a domestic description, generally the result of 
passion or wounded pride; and in most cases there is a woman in the matter . . . These 
cases then are not so much a question of police as of social habits; there is no 
preventing them.
60
  
This laissez-faire attitude towards the (actual or imagined) prevalence of wife-killing 
by Indian men stands in stark contrast to the voluminous reports and regular investigative 
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commissions during the nineteenth century generated by other violent crimes in India that 
were held by the imperial regime to result from indigenous beliefs and customs, such as sati, 
thuggee, or female infanticide.
61
 It is also a particularly startling absence given the repeated 
emphasis in many such official reports and popular narratives throughout the nineteenth 
century on Britain having a special obligation to stage dramatic social and legislative 
interventions in order to protect the lives of Indian women and girls.
62
 Although the age of 
victims that were teenaged or child brides might sometimes be mentioned by the court, this 
was not done systematically in the reports, nor did this factor guarantee harsher judicial 
treatment of the prisoner.
63
 In the case of domestic violence and wife murder, the normally 
ubiquitous colonial tendency to stake a claim for ‘White men saving brown women from 
brown men’64 was uncharacteristically absent. This did not prevent individual sessions judges 
and magistrates (or even those men sitting at the Nizamat Adalat itself) from lamenting the 
prevalence of wife-beating or wife-killing in India, expressing sympathy for victims, and 
urging that examples be made of offenders. Reference was occasionally made in the reports 
of the Nizamat Adalat to wife-beating or even wife killing being endemic across Bengal, and 
demanding that punishments for the guilty needed to be severe in order to deter other 
offenders. Yet such calls, however sincerely felt and meant, were always in regard to the 
court having tried specific cases – they do not ever seem to have resulted in sustained 
campaigns for legislative change, or shifts in imperial policy relating to this subject.
65
 
THE HEART OF THE MATTER: PROVOCATION, JUSTIFICATION AND 
ADULTERY 
The question of whether or not the dead woman had been unfaithful to her husband 
was a key element in a substantial proportion of the wife-murder cases reviewed by the 
Nizamat Adalat during this period. In no less than 48 cases of the 131 examined here (36.6 
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per cent of the total), the convicted men attempted to justify the killing of their wife on these 
grounds. This was almost certainly because under Islamic law it was not a crime to kill either 
an unfaithful wife or her paramour if the husband did so after having actually witnessed them 
having sex, and, as I have noted, even the English courts would have treated such a killing as 
‘the lowest form of [manslaughter] because there could not be a greater provocation’.66 If the 
Nizamat Adalat could be convinced, this was, quite literally, a get out of jail free card for the 
prisoner. In all three of the cases between 1805 and 1857 where the Nizamat Adalat ordered 
the immediate release of a man convicted at a sessions court for the murder of his wife, this 
was because the court argued it had been successfully proven that the woman’s death had 
followed immediately on him witnessing her commit adultery.
67
 What is perhaps surprising, 
however, in the light of the sustained willingness of the Nizamat Adalat to consider infidelity 
and other mitigating factors in wife killings as reducing the culpability of the husband, is how 
seldom actual releases occurred. No such wife-murder cases seem to have met the burden of 
evidence necessary to justify the husband’s release from 1839 to 1857.  The Nizamat Adalat 
acknowledged the potential danger posed by accepting stories of wifely unfaithfulness too 
easily, and cases such as that of Government vs. Munoo in 1854, where the prisoner claimed 
(with no supporting evidence, and to the palpable incredulity of the court) to have stabbed his 
wife with a sword immediately after she had sex with three strangers while they were 
travelling on the road to his in-laws home, underscored this concern.
68
 In fact, one judge 
during the 1838 review of Muddun Patur’s case questioned whether he could really be 
accepted as having killed his wife immediately on catching her and her lover together in the 
garden of his home, since she had been attacked and killed as she ran for the house after 
being discovered. Although the other two judges sitting in this case overruled their 
colleague’s objection that this short span of minutes was enough time for Patur to have 
reasonably calmed himself and correspondingly move the verdict from justifiable to culpable 
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homicide, it is worth noting that this was the last instance of a wife-murderer being ordered 
for immediate release by the Nizamat Adalat on the grounds he had committed no crime 
under Islamic law.
69
 Henceforth, the best a defendant could hope for was that the court would 
reduce the charge to culpable homicide on review in light of him having been ‘provoked’, 
and that the resulting prison sentence would be comparatively short. As  I have shown above 
(Table 1.), this was in practice a somewhat likelier outcome than the possible alternative 
sentences of either life imprisonment, transportation, or a period of 7-14 years imprisonment.  
In two further cases, although adultery of the wife was not formally raised as a plea of 
mitigation, the evidence heard by the court made oblique reference to this subject. 
Neighbours testified in 1851 that they had attempted to intervene when a man named 
Googuria was heard accusing his wife of infidelity and threatening to murder her while he 
beat her, although he did not later repeat this claim when on trial.
70
 In another case, from 
1853, the prisoner, Sheikh Kureem, claimed that he had killed his wife because she was going 
to leave him for another man, although there was no mention of an actual affair having taken 
place.
71
 In both these instances, however, the conduct of the guilty man meant that the court 
promptly dismissed any suggestion of this supposed infidelity or other circumstances as 
reducing the charge to one of culpable homicide. After his neighbours had stopped him 
beating his wife, and he had already branded her on the neck with a hot iron, Googuria had 
waited for the villagers to return to their homes, then tied his wife’s hands and thrown her 
into the village well to drown.
72
  Despite the attempt of Sheikh Kureem to plead outraged 
masculine honour at the prospect of his wife leaving him, the court heard that the killing had 
taken place within a year of their ostensible reconciliation: he had originally thrown her out 
of the marital home with their newborn son after their marriage in 1842, and taken up for 
some years with another woman who he had also then deserted.
73
 Unsurprisingly, the 
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Nizamat Adalat saw no reason in either case to mitigate the death sentence that had been 
passed by the sessions court upon these men, and confirmed that they should be executed.  
 
‘REASSERTING AUTHORITY’: THE ROLE AND RIGHTS OF HUSBANDS 
Just as Barbara Alpern Engel has observed was the case for Late Imperial Russia, in 
both India and England during the early nineteenth century ‘Many abusive men suspected, or 
claimed to suspect, infidelity behind every act of wifely independence.’74 Men who claimed 
that the death of their wife had resulted from either an attempt to avenge their own masculine 
dishonour or to reassert their role as head of the household had to do so with care. A husband 
who killed his wife might well be able to claim successfully, as did Binode Roy when his 
case was reviewed in January 1851; that he had beaten his wife before and had not intended 
for her to die on this occasion.
75
  The Nizamat Adalat was frequently willing to offer the 
benefit of the doubt to men who alleged their wife was unfaithful, and to consider this as 
grounds for reducing either the charge itself from murder to culpable homicide, or, even if the 
conviction for murder was upheld, issuing a sentence of imprisonment or transportation 
rather than execution.  In a case from 1822, the prisoner claimed that his wife’s adultery was 
so notorious that ‘his neighbours had refused to associate with him on grounds of his wife’s 
misconduct’.76  Although upholding his conviction for murder, the Nizamat Adalat decreed 
he should be sentenced to life imprisonment rather than death.
77
 This leniency did not extend, 
however, to cases in which witness testimony provided in the reports demonstrated that such 
suspicions on the part of the husband were baseless. When Hurree Singh claimed in 1805 that 
he had killed his wife after she repeatedly ran away from him into the forest to have affairs, 
his neighbours flatly insisted that there were no grounds for such beliefs and that the reason 
his wife kept running away had been a combination of childishness – she was only 12 years 
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old – and that ‘her mind was apparently deranged’.78 The Court upheld the death penalty in 
Singh’s case.79 Likewise, although Kufeeroodeen tried to claim his wife had been unfaithful 
when his case was reviewed in May 1851, both the sessions court and the Nizamat Adalat 
were scathing in their assessment of this defence.
80
 The good character of his wife, 
Mussamaut Bennoo, was widely attested to during his trial at the sessions court.
81
 In 
confirming the death sentence on the prisoner, one of the judges of the Nizamat Adalat who 
reviewed this case felt moved to remark that similar cases should be dealt with severely by 
the court, ‘...we know too well that there are men with hard and brutish temperaments, who 
will brook no opposition from those who are dependent upon them’.82 Men whose neighbours 
or relatives testified that they had frequently had to intervene to prevent him abusing his wife 
in the past, or that the prisoner was known for his malice or ill-temper risked being made an 
example of by the court. Patan Gazee, whose case was reviewed in 1855, claimed that he had 
lived very happily with his teenaged wife.
83
 Yet it was established from the outset that during 
the eight years they had been married Gazee had become infamous in their community for 
having been ‘habitually unkind to her, refusing even to allow her to pay occasional visits to 
her [mother]’.84  Tragically, it seemed that the reason for the killing was that Gazee had 
overheard the victim’s mother saying to a friend she was going to consult a magistrate the 
following day in order to get her daughter away from the constant violence of her husband. 
Given that even the witness called for the defence ‘in fact rather supported the case for the 
prosecution’, it is perhaps unsurprising the Nizamat Adalat decreed he should suffer the death 
penalty.
85
 British judges reviewing these cases thus made a clear effort to take into account 
localised and customary attitudes to what a husband might or might not be ‘allowed’ to do. 
Murderous husbands condemned by their community as transgressing these boundaries were 
much more likely to suffer a severe punishment when their sentence was reviewed by the 
colonial authorities. 
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MOTIVELESS WIFE MURDERS AND INSANITY 
Relatively few of the men whose cases were reviewed by the Nizamat Adalat in this 
period were adjudged to be suffering from mental illness at the time that they killed their 
wives. Only four husbands were considered to fit within this category (3 per cent of the total). 
In some instances, this was fairly clear cut. Multiple witnesses testified in the case of 
Burkutoollah, reviewed in 1853, that he had suffered from mental health problems for over a 
year before he killed his wife.
86
  One villager noted that he was not normally violent, but 
‘Like other madmen he talked to himself’.87 Because he had begun to behave so erratically, 
Burkutoollah’s family had actually arranged for an exorcism the day before the murder in 
order to drive out the evil spirit they believed had sent him mad.
88
 Although the sessions 
judge himself was dubious, the civil surgeon gave it as his opinion that Burkutoollah had 
been insane at the time he killed his wife, and the Nizamat Adalat upheld this, acquitting him 
on the grounds of insanity and following the usual practice that like other insane prisoners he 
should be kept confined until such time as he recovered.
89
 Substantial evidence seems to have 
been needed for the courts to take this plea seriously and invariably this included the expert 
opinion of a medical man.
90
 Without this, an attempt at an insanity defence was unlikely to be 
believed. During the review of Rajkissore Dhanook’s case in 1851, only the prisoner’s 
mother-in-law had claimed he had suffered from mental illness previously, and it was not 
mentioned by other witnesses.
91
 The Nizamat Adalat dismissed the idea he had been insane 
as unsupported by the evidence, and confirmed the death sentence on Dhanook.
92
 Paralleling 
similar debates in the English courts during this period, some cases where a prisoner was not, 
ultimately, held to be insane also provoked considerable unease during the review about 
where precisely the boundary fell between mental illness, legal responsibility, and moral or 
intellectual weakness that did not preclude knowing right from wrong.
93
 For colonial lawyers 
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and physicians, racist stereotyping of South and Southeast Asian men and women as prone to 
violent emotional outbursts arguably made drawing this boundary of criminal responsibility 
even more complicated than it was in Britain.
94
 The case of Bolaki, reviewed by the Nizamat 
Adalat in November 1850, was one in point.
95
 Neighbours testified during his trial at the 
Patna Sessions Court that they had heard cries coming from his house, where they found him 
bludgeoning his wife with a kodalee (a type of hoe). The couple were believed in their village 
to have a good relationship, and the sudden and lethal attack on his wife seemed to have been 
for no other reason the court could determine than because he was angry she had not finished 
preparing his meal.
96
 Although the sessions judge did not consider Bolaki to be mad, he noted 
that ‘....the prisoner was a man of violent temper, and susceptible of excitement to such an 
extent, that he might commit the utmost violence before he was well conscious of what he 
was doing’.97 
Complicating matters further, the civil surgeon testified that Bolaki was insane – but 
that in his opinion, this had been brought on by the shock of realising he had killed his wife, 
rather than prior to her murder.
98
 Concurring with this assessment, and agreeing with the 
sessions judge that the death penalty would nonetheless be unjust, the Nizamat Adalat 
ordered that he be sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labour at the Patna jail, with the 
guards under instructions to monitor him carefully for any further signs of mental illness.
99
 
More common than a finding of insanity were those cases where the court found 
themselves searching in vain for a motive which could explain –however imperfectly – what 
had prompted a man to kill his wife. It is significant that despite the stated belief of some 
British officials that ‘the practice of beating wives in this district for the most trivial offence 
is of frequent occurrence, and death often ensues in consequence’,100 the courts usually 
worked on the assumption there must invariably have been some sort of provocation (even if 
20 
 
the judges themselves considered this was grossly unfair to the dead woman)  in most cases 
of alleged wife-murder that patient investigation by the authorities could uncover. Such 
assumptions rested on the idea that Indians of both sexes were prone to particular ‘wildness’ 
of character that was inflamed by adherence to tribal or caste customs.
101
  If such a motive 
could not be ascribed to the prisoner, the court then often struggled to assess what the most 
‘just’ sentence might be for the case in question. 
CONCLUSIONS  
Attitudes to wife murders and domestic violence in early nineteenth century India 
were profoundly influenced by the permeable boundaries between ‘acceptable’ and 
‘unacceptable’ conduct for married couples in England during this period. Although it was 
never the case that violent husbands in Bengal would automatically be viewed with sympathy 
by the Nizamat Adalat, the perception that Indian men (like working-class British men) were 
culturally and perhaps even psychologically incapable of self-control in the way middle-class 
British men were meant that the courts in both nations were often willing to take a lenient 
view of what constituted ‘provocation’ in these cases. Such sympathy, however, fell within 
very definite limits, and rested in part on either the degree to which a wife failed to conform 
to her expected role, or that the defendant could not be perceived as simply brutish. The 
suspicion of adultery by wives, in particular, remained a powerful plea to the judges if there 
was even limited evidence to support this claim. Such imported ideas were integral to the 
development of ‘Anglo-Muhammadan’ criminal law during the nineteenth century. It is also 
essential to recognise just how long these attitudes, and the case law that they helped to 
generate, persisted in both England and India. As late as 1946, the House of Lords formally 
upheld the principle during their review of Holmes v. D.P.P. that infidelity could still be 
considered ‘reasonable provocation’ for homicide if the defendant had actually witnessed the 
21 
 
couple having sex immediately beforehand, although they added that in the future the rule 
must be applied that this principle now held just as true for women who killed unfaithful 
husbands or their mistresses as it had always been for men.
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